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Implementation of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in India: Spatial 
Dimensions and Fiscal Implications 
 






Since its enactment in 2005, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) has 
been implemented in 200 districts in India. Based on state-by-state employment demand-
supply data and the use of funds released under NREGA, it is found that, although it is a 
demand-driven scheme, there are significant interstate differences in the supply of 
employment. The supply falls far short of demand, particularly in low-income states, where 
the organizational capacity to implement the scheme is limited. It is also noted that the 
NREGA-induced fiscal expansion has not contributed to higher fiscal imbalances. The 
consolidation of other public employment programs into NREGA has actually kept the total 
allocation of funds by the central government at a level no higher than those reached in the 
fiscal years 2002–03 to 2005–06. The NREGA fund utilization ratio varies widely across 
states and is abysmally low in the poorer states. Since the flow of resources to individual 
states is based on approved plans outlining employment demand, it may turn out to be 
regressive for the poorer states with low organizational capacity in terms of planning and 
management of the schemes, especially labor demand forecasting.    
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The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was enacted by the Indian 
Parliament in 2005 to provide a minimum guaranteed wage employment of one hundred days 
in every fiscal year to rural households with unemployed adult members prepared to do 
unskilled manual work. In the past, public employment programs in India targeted at the poor 
were generally identified with the poverty alleviation. NREGA goes beyond poverty 
alleviation and recognizes employment as a legal right. The only example of guaranteed state-
sponsored employment in India is the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme, which 
was enacted and implemented under the extraordinary circumstances of severe drought in the 
state during 1970 to 1973 as innovative anti-poverty intervention (Dev and Ranade 2001). 
Just as the NREGA provides opportunities for the rural households to assure livelihood 
security, it presents formidable challenges in implementation. The latest report on the 
completion of one year of NREGA, published by the Ministry of Rural Development, also 
highlighted the fact that “States are at various level of implementation of NREGA depending 
on when they started their preparations and their pace of preparation.” Our study also 
highlights the differential performance of states in terms of implementation and tries to 
explore the reasons thereof. This paper is based on the state by state employment demand-
supply data and the use of funds released under NREGA by the central government, and 
examines the budgetary incidence and spatial dimension of the progress of implementation of 
the act.  
Apart from the introduction, the paper is organized in four sections. Section I 
discusses the salient features of the NREGA. In Section II, the history of public employment 
programs and the interface between employment situation, wage rate, and poverty incidence 
is discussed. Section III undertakes a detailed empirical analysis of the spatial dimension of 
implementation, problems of funding, and budgetary incidence of NREGA. Based on the 
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I.  THE ACT: SALIENT FEATURES 
 
The NREGA extends to all rural areas of India, including Fifth and Sixth Schedule areas,
1 
except Jammu and Kashmir. The various provisions of the NREGA are the following: (i) it 
provides at least one hundred days of guaranteed wage employment in every fiscal year for at 
least one adult member of every household prepared to do unskilled manual labor at the wage 
rate specified by the state government; (ii) creation of durable assets and strengthening the 
livelihood resource base of the rural poor shall be an important objective of the scheme. The 
state council shall prepare a list of permissible works, as well as a list of “preferred works”; 
(iii) the program may also provide, as far as possible, for the training and upgradation of the 
skills of unskilled laborers; (iv) wages may be paid in cash, in kind, or both, provided that at 
least one-fourth of the wages shall be paid in cash only; (v) employment shall be provided 
within a radius of five kilometers of the village where the applicant resides at the time of 
applying. In cases where employment is provided outside such radius, it must be provided 
within the block, and the laborers shall be paid 10 percent of the wage rate as extra wages to 
meet additional transport and living expenses; (vi) in case the number of children below the 
age of six years accompanying the women working at any site is five or more, provisions shall 
be made to depute one women worker to look after such children. The person deputed for this 
shall be paid the statutory minimum wage; and (vii) a proportion of the wages, not exceeding 
5 percent, may be deducted as a contribution to welfare schemes organized for the benefit of 
laborers employed under the program, such as health insurance, accident insurance, survivor 
benefits, maternity benefits, and social security schemes. 
As specified in the act, for the purpose of funding and the implementation of NREGA, 
the central government will set up the National Employment Guarantee Fund. Individual state 
governments will set up the State Employment Guarantee Fund for matching contribution 
under this scheme. The funding pattern, as laid down in the act, specifies that the central 
government’s obligation would be to make payments of wages for unskilled manual workers 
under the scheme, up to three-fourths of the material costs of the scheme, including wages to 
                                                           
1 The Fifth Schedule covers tribal areas in states of India, namely Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Himachal 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and Rajasthan. The Fifth Schedule is a Historic 
Guarantee to indigenous people on the right over the land they live in. The Sixth Schedule deals with the 
administration of tribal areas in the State of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram.   4
skilled and semiskilled workers and a certain percentage of the total cost of the schemes 
determined by the central government. The state government shall have to bear the cost of 
unemployment allowance, one-fourth of the material costs, and the administrative expenses of 
the state council. Apart from the mandatory provision of resources required for the 
implementation of NREGA, its success in enhancing the “livelihood security” of rural 
households would critically depend on the effective implementation of the scheme. 
NREGA provides for a multitier structure of authority for implementation and 
monitoring of the scheme with specified functions and duties for each authority. The agencies 
involved are Central Employment Guarantee Council, State Employment Guarantee Council, 
District Program Coordinator, and the Program Officer appointed by the state government and 
the Gram Panchayat. The responsibility of the Gram Panchayat will be the identification, 
execution, and supervision of projects as per the recommendations of Gram Sabhas (village 
assembly). For accountability and transparency purposes, the Gram Sabhas are given the 
power to conduct a regular social audit of individual schemes. The structure of 
implementation as laid down indicates that a coordinated approach of different tiers of 
government or vertical coordination is critical for successful implementation of the scheme. 
Also, the horizontal coordination across departments for program identification and execution 
of work through Panchayat assumes critical importance.  
 
II.  PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAM, EMPLOYMENT SITUATION, AND WAGE 
RATE: AN OVERVIEW 
 
There is a growing theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of public works 
programs on poverty alleviation (Dreze and Sen 1989; Ravallion 1991; Besley and Coate 
1992; Sen 1995). Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme apart, India has a long history 
of public works programs, particularly in rural areas as a poverty reduction strategy. After 
India’s independence in 1947, there were many central government schemes for public 
employment, beginning with the rural manpower program in 1960. Public employment has 
proved to be an effective strategy for prevention of famine and poverty reduction (World 
Bank 1990). NREGA also focuses on the districts having high incidence of poverty (see Table 
1). 
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However, NREGA goes beyond poverty reduction and recognizes employment as a 
legal right. Skeptics considered it as a populist measure while others have considered it as a 
landmark initiative towards poverty alleviation and empowerment of poor. It is argued that 
this would not only increase the income of the poor, but the asset creation through the process 
of employment would generate a much needed productive infrastructure for poverty 
alleviation on a permanent basis. It is also seen as an initiative to operationalize the concept of 
the right to work, enshrined in the Constitution under the Directive Principles of State Policy 
(Papola 2005), by guaranteeing work to those who are demanding employment. 
However, if one looks at the employment scenario in the country during the 1980s and 
1990s, one would observe that during the tenth Five Year Plan, the growth rate of 
employment has slowed down considerably.
2 The annual rate of growth of rural employment 
was around 0.5 percent per annum between 1993–94 and 1999–2000, as compared to 1.7 
percent per annum between 1983 and 1993–94 and also the current daily status 
unemployment rate in rural areas increased from 5.63 percent in 1993–94 to 7.21 percent in 
1999–2000. The deceleration in employment growth was further reinforced by a sharp cut 
back in public spending on rural employment programs (Dev 2002). In this context, the 
enactment of NREGA is appropriate and timely. Although, the aggregate employment figure 
shows a decline, national sample survey estimates of unemployment rates in 1999–2000 
showed that the rate of unemployment in “usually unemployed” category in 1999–2000 was 
only 2 percent for the male labor force and less than 2 percent for the female labor force. 
Despite low unemployment rates, the incidence of income poverty in rural areas is at least 
four times the incidence of unemployment as per the current daily status, which implies that 
the number of poor far outweighs the number of poor for want of work (Kannan 2005). This, 
in other words, implies that the quality of employment is so low that the wage rate is 
inadequate to take care of even the limited notion of income poverty. Thus, if NREGA has to 
make a perceptible dent on poverty, the applicable wage rate assumes paramount importance.  
Though there is a cost implication of a particular wage rate from the budgetary point 
of view, in order to make a significant impact on rural poverty, it should be such that it 
provides “livelihood security.” In this context, Papola (2005) emphasised that (i) wages 
                                                           
2 Hirway (2005) noted that though the average annual rate of growth of GDP was higher in the 1990s (6.7 
percent) than in the 1980s (5.2 percent), the rate of growth of employment was much lower (1.07 percent) in the 
1990s than in the 1980s (2.7 percent).   6
should be high enough to meet the daily subsistence need of the workers’ households; and (ii) 
in order that the really needy avail of the guaranteed work and no diversion of labor takes 
place from other regular productive work, wages should not be significantly higher than the 
market wage rate. The second proposition would hold good, theoretically, if the prescribed 
wage rate under NREGA is higher than the market wage rate. In Maharashtra, no clear 
evidence of such an impact has been recorded, although the possibility of employment 
guarantee schemes (EGS) having treated upward pressure on agricultural wages has been 
indicated (Acharya 1990; Datt 1994).  
  The statutory minimum wage rate for an agricultural laborer is being offered under 
NREGA. A state by state comparison of the average daily rural wages for casual workers and 
the statutory minimum wage rates in the respective states reveals that, in many of the states, 
the statutory minimum wage rate is much lower than the market wage rate. It is to be noted 
that the statutory wage rate data pertain to June 2001 and the market wage rate data pertain to 
2004. Thus, they are not strictly comparable. However, even an annual 4 percent increase the 
statutory wage rate to keep the real wage constant will not make it at par with the market 
wage rate of 2004 in most of the states. Given this large positive differential between the 
market and the statutory wage rate, the demand for work under NREGA may not be as high as 
one would assume and the possibility of a laborer shifting from other sectors to NREGA-
based employment seems remote in this context in many of the states. But the same may not 
hold good in the context of a state like Bihar, where both the wage rates are more or less 
equal, and in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh where the statutory wage rate is higher than 
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Table 1: Average Daily Wages for Casual Workers: Rural (in Rs.) 
 
  Male  Female  Persons  St. Min. Rate 
Andhra Pradesh  48.32  31.08  40.86  25.96 
Assam 58.88  54.17  57.98  33.10 
Bihar 44.29  37.46  42.91  41.02 
Chhattisgarh 35.40  30.21  33.19   
Gujarat 49.22  36.31  45.20  46.80 
Haryana 79.92  67.65  78.00  73.65 
Himachal Pradesh  83.21  72.51  82.29  51.00 
Jammu & Kashmir  94.79  77.64  93.58  30.00 
Jharkhand 53.53  42.00  51.48  
Karnataka 50.61  31.27  43.67  40.55 
Kerala 123.65  68.15  112.20  30.00 
Madhya Pradesh  46.56  31.47  41.36  51.80 
Maharashtra 51.48  35.48  44.94  8.46 
Orissa 46.72  29.48  43.22  40.00 
Punjab 78.37  59.57  77.07  70.85 
Rajasthan 64.68  48.73  61.55  47.05 
Tamil Nadu  71.35  35.52  57.78  32.00 
Uttaranchal 60.88  52.69  58.65   
Uttar Pradesh  58.84  39.80  56.22  58.00 
West Bengal  49.96  40.36  48.60  48.22 
North Eastern States  66.22  48.97  63.27   
All India  56.53  36.15  50.70  47.53 
  N o t e :  Statutory minimum wage pertains to June 12, 2001. 
  Source:  Average daily wage data from NSS 60
th Round (January 2004–June 2005) 
    Published in November 2005 and http://labourbureau.nic.in/wagetab.htm 
 
III.  PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTATION AND FUNDING: THE SPATIAL        
DIMENSION  
 
The important components involved in the implementation of the NREGA are: (i) selection of 
beneficiaries and the wage rate; (ii) design of system and institutions for implementation of 
the scheme; (iii) provisioning of resources and the pattern of funding; (iv) capacity building 
for effective implementation of the scheme; and (v) safeguarding against corruption with 
regard to the use of funds and the selection of beneficiaries.  
The earlier wage employment programs (WEP) have helped in many ways in 
stabilizing wages and food grain prices in rural areas. However, the coverage of the scheme 
remained poor and more than 50 percent of the beneficiaries were not from the most 
economically vulnerable sections in rural areas. Other than these, there were issues of   8
corruption in the form of underpayment of wages, differential wage payment to male and 
female workers, and proliferation of contractors in the implementation of the schemes. 
It has been specified in the act that “if an applicant under this act is not provided such 
employment within fifteen days of his application seeking employment,” s/he shall be entitled 
to a daily unemployment allowance which will be paid by the state government. This implies 
a built-in structure of incentive for performance and disincentive for nonperformance for the 
state government, as inability to provide employment would cause the state government to 
pay unemployment allowance for which there is no contribution from the central government. 
In other words, individual state governments will have to evolve a well-coordinated approach 
to equate supply of employment in accordance with the demand. This becomes all the more 
important as there is no supply-side selection of beneficiaries. This requires in-depth 
understanding of region-specific labor demand and its seasonality so that a demand-based 
scheme of projects can be implemented at a frequency matching with the demand for work 
instead of supply-side provisioning. Failure to do this may result in imprudent use of funds, as 
inability to provide employment on demand will impose the burden of compensation, in the 
form of unemployment allowance, to the state government. Thus, there is a need to design a 
monitoring mechanism by strengthening institutional structure at the local level so that 
resources can be used optimally. As it is a demand-based provisioning, the flow of resources 
from the higher levels of government to the Panchayats needs to be ensured according to the 
demand. Thus, we need to evolve a clear mechanism of flow of funds as needed according to 
the demand rather than through the normal bureaucratic procedure. This would also require 
good coordination between providing work and provision of funding. The funding pattern and 
the conditionalities attached to the release of funds from the central government to the states 
are given in Box 1. The conditionalities with regard to the use of funds are stringent and the 
demand based provisioning may be potentially regressive. The funds will be released based 
on the Annual Work Plan and Budget Proposal (AWPB) by the states. As the capacity to 
formulate AWPB by the states is low in poorer states, actual release may fall far short of 
potential demand for funds. 
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Box 1: Funding of NREG 
FINANCING PATTERN 
The central government will bear the following costs: 
•  The entire cost of wages for unskilled manual workers. 
•  Seventy-five percent of the cost of material and wages for skilled and semiskilled workers. 
•  Administrative expenses as may be determined by the central government. These will include, inter alia, the 
salary and allowances of program officers, their support staff, and work site facilities. 
•  Administrative expenses of the Central Employment Guarantee Council. 
 
The state government will bear the following costs: 
•  Twenty-five percent of the cost of material and wages for skilled and semiskilled workers. 
•  Unemployment allowance payable in case the state government cannot provide wage employment within 15 
days of application. 
•  Administrative expenses of the State Employment Guarantee Council. 
 
RELEASE OF FUNDS 
9  The release of funds is based on state proposals rather than on predetermined allocations. 
9  Under the scheme, each state will formulate and submit a State Annual Work Plan and Budget Proposal 
(AWPB) to the Ministry of Rural Development, which will enable the Ministry to decide and sanction the 
budget likely to be used by the state in that year. 
9  The AWPB will be based on the demand for funds received from the districts and reflected in the labor 
budgets approved by the district Panchayats. 
9  The AWPB will also report on the use of the previous funds received by the state, as well as on the key 
performance indicators determined under the scheme. This will enable a qualitative assessment of the 
proposals received from a state government to help decide the quantum of assistance likely to be released to 
it for a financial year. The actual release of funds to a state government will depend on its actual utilization 
of funds previously released. 
9  After utilizing 60 percent of the funds released earlier, the district program coordinator (with the 
recommendation of the state government) or the state government (in the event that a State Employment 
Guarantee Fund is established) may apply to the Ministry of Rural Development for the next installment out 
of the Central Employment Guarantee Fund.  
9  The state share of funds will be released by the state government within 15 days of the release of the central 
funds. 
Source: NREGA Operational Guidelines, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India 
 
A.  The Spatial Dimension  
As mentioned earlier, this scheme has been implemented in two hundred backward districts in 
the country, spread over 27 states. In these districts, Panchayats will be the principal agency 
through which the act will be implemented. As mentioned earlier, Panchayats will be 
responsible for the identification, execution, and supervision of projects as per the 
recommendations of Gram Sabha and the Ward Sabhas, and the Gram Sabhas are given the 
power to conduct a regular social audit of individual schemes. A number of questions arise in 
this context. Out of these two hundred districts, some are covered under Scheduled Area Act. 
Of the remaining districts, a good proportion in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Jharkhand are 
virtually under extremist control. There are also other districts where Panchayats are simply   10
nonexistent and, in many places, nonfunctional. There is also the problem of not having 
regular and dedicated functionaries for many of the Panchayats. Given these constraints, 
evolving a policy design and implementation strategy for NREGA becomes extremely 
difficult and thus, challenging. 
 
Table 2: NREGA Districts: State Income and Poverty 
States are in ascending 











of Rural BPL 
Households 
General  Category States 
Bihar  5606 23  14.36  20.73 
Uttar Pradesh  9963 3  13.26  13.49 
Orissa  10164 19  7.10  11.11 
Jharkhand  11139 20  6.29  9.08 
Madhya Pradesh  11500 18  6.57  7.94 
Chhattisgarh  12244 11  3.75  4.53 
Rajasthan  12641 6  2.40  1.07 
West Bengal  18494 10  13.08  13.58 
Andhra Pradesh  19087 13  12.43  4.48 
Karnataka  19576 5  2.38  1.35 
Tamil Nadu  21740 6  3.83  2.56 
Gujarat  22624 6  2.57  1.10 
Kerala  22776 2  1.14  0.35 
Punjab  26395 1  0.41  0.09 
Haryana  26818 2  0.48  0.13 
Maharashtra  26858 12  6.87  5.32 
Special Category States 
Assam  12247 7  1.51  1.97 
Manipur  12878 1  0.03  0.04 
Jammu & Kashmir  14507 3  0.45  0.06 
Uttaranchal  14947 22  0.38  0.39 
Meghalaya  16803 2  0.19  0.25 
Arunachal Pradesh  16946 1  0.01  0.02 
Tripura  18550 1  0.11  0.14 
Sikkim  20013 1  0.02  0.03 
Nagaland  20746 1  0.06  0.08 
Mizoram  22207 2  0.04  0.05 
Himachal Pradesh  22902 2  0.28  0.07 
All  States  17883  200 100 100 
    Source (basic data): http://nrega.nic.in/ 
  
 
As can be seen from Table 2, out of the two hundred districts, 119 of them fall in 
seven states, viz., Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and 
Uttar Pradesh. Needless to mention, these states rank low in socioeconomic development of   11
the country. These states are predominantly rural and 53.73 percent of the rural Indian 
households and 67.95 percent of the rural below poverty line (BPL) households reside in these 
119 districts of seven states. This distribution pattern of districts in terms of rural BPL 
households reinforces the argument that NREGA intends to attack the poverty stricken 
regions of the country. These regions are also the most backward regions in terms of rural 
connectivity, spread of banking, the nature of rural power structure, and the quality of 
governance. On the other hand, we have districts that are to be covered in the northeast region 
having their own special problems and are under scheduled areas. However, the number of 
districts to be covered in the northeast, including Sikkim, is only 16.  
In order to examine the performance of NREG implementation, suitable indicators 
need to be developed that would reflect the demand-side or the preference for NREG among 
rural households and also supply-side performance. The demand-side preferences are captured 
through the three following ratios: 
 
i.  EG enrollment as percentage of total number of rural households. 
ii.  EG enrollment as a percentage of rural below poverty line (BPL) households. 
iii. EG enrollment as a percentage of application for enrollment. 
 
The first two ratios will reflect the preference of the households, both BPL and non-
BPL, for a NREG job. The third ratio will show the suppliers response to enrollment for 
employment guarantee. It is to be noted here that enrollment for an employment guarantee 
does not necessarily mean provisioning of employment. Enrollment is a prerequisite for 
NREG employment by issuing a job card by the Panchayat to the person demanding NREG. 
  
The supply-side performance is also judged in terms of three following ratios: 
 
i.  EG provisioning as a percentage of rural households. 
ii.  EG provisioning as a percentage of rural BPL households. 
iii. EG provisioning as a percentage of number of households enrolled. 
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Table 3: EG Enrollment and Provisioning: A State by State Comparison 
EG Enrollment as  % of  EG Provisioning as  % of  States are in 
ascending order of 











Number of  
Household 
Enrolled 
General Category States 
Bihar 22.20  50.11  66.05  5.47  12.35  24.65 
Uttar Pradesh  40.81  130.73  95.28  13.30  42.61  32.60 
Orissa 57.16  119.05  79.38  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Jharkhand 35.49  80.12 64.14 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Madhya Pradesh  123.42  333.03  99.06  44.19  119.23  35.80 
Chhattisgarh 82.41  222.37  95.05  24.88  67.14  30.19 
Rajasthan 109.96 800.31  98.57 65.39  475.94  59.47 
West Bengal  48.34  151.77  75.88  13.46  42.25  27.84 
Andhra Pradesh  64.98  588.08  100.00  11.44  103.53  17.60 
Karnataka 24.58  141.45  48.62 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Tamil Nadu  49.55  241.14  98.97  3.76  18.28  7.58 
Gujarat 44.02  334.25  100.00  6.64  50.44  15.09 
Kerala 36.61  390.27  99.36  0.00 0.00  0.00 
Punjab 16.81  264.34  92.51  0.00 0.00  0.00 
Haryana 31.34  378.98  96.89  6.47  78.18  20.63 
Maharashtra 29.48  124.29 26.44  2.54  10.71  8.62 
Special Category States 
Assam 50.40  125.88  68.51  10.90  27.22  21.62 
Manipur 110.72  276.52  29.49  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
66.05 1663.61  85.20  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Uttaranchal 92.89  297.54 67.64  9.99  32.00  10.76 
Meghalaya 0.00  0.00  #DIV/0!  0.00  0.00  #DIV/0! 
Arunachal Pradesh 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  #DIV/0! 
Tripura 111.77  279.14  91.93  125.20  312.68  112.02 
Sikkim 40.60  101.38  92.06  0.00 0.00  0.00 
Nagaland 87.30  218.05  100.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 
Mizoram 35.13 87.74  100.00  9.34  23.33  26.58 
Himachal Pradesh  52.78  664.68  96.65  23.74  298.93  44.97 
All States  51.19  166.85  79.15  12.06  39.32  23.57 
Note: Household numbers pertain to Census 2001. Thus, in some states EG enrollment to rural household ratio is more than 
100 percent. 
Source (basic data): http://nrega.nic.in/ 
 
It is evident from Table 3 that EG enrollment as a percentage of rural households 
enrolled for NREG varies widely across states. It is also to be noted that enrollment for NREG 
far exceeds the number of BPL households in most states, except for Bihar and Jharkhand. In 
Bihar and Jharkhand, only 50 and 80 percent of the BPL households could obtain NREG 
enrollment. If we look at the NREG enrollment as a percentage of the number of applicants, it 
is abysmally low in Maharashtra, followed by Karnataka, Bihar, and Jharkhand. It is also to   13
be noted that while for Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat the supply of employment has met the 
demand, for most other states, enrollment falls far short of the demand. The all-state ratio is 
79.15 percent. 
If we look at the provisioning to demand for EG ratios in major states in the country, it 
is more than 90 percent in all the states (see Table 4). However, this is misleading, as only 79 
percent of the applicants for EG were actually enrolled and this ratio is particularly low in 
poorer states. If we adjust the demand for EG data for this exclusion, the exclusion-adjusted 
demand increases and the ratio falls far below the actual provisioning to demand. As evident 
from Table 3, it is particularly low in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Maharashtra. 
The states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are the poorest states in the country. These two states 
together cover 45 districts of the 200 districts under NREGA implementation.  
 
Table 4: EG Provisioning, EG Demand and Exclusion: A State by State Comparison 
 Actual  EG 
Provisioning  
to Demand Ratio 
Exclusion Adjusted EG 
Provisioning  to 
Demand Ratio 
Bihar 0.97  0.32 
Uttar Pradesh  0.86  0.18 
Madhya Pradesh  0.95  0.93 
Chhattisgarh 1.00  0.85 
Rajasthan 0.99  0.97 
West Bengal  0.87  0.44 
Andhra Pradesh  1.00  1.00 
Tamil Nadu  0.96  0.85 
Gujarat 1.00  1.00 
Himachal Pradesh 0.93  0.87 
Haryana 1.00  0.87 
Maharashtra 0.30  0.03 
            Source (basic data): http://nrega.nic.in/ 
 
  It needs to be mentioned that the data provided in the latest report on NREGA, 
published by the Ministry of Rural Development, also indicate that the fund utilization ratio 
remains as low as 51 percent, even after the completion of one full year of operation of 
NREGA. In other words, only half the total available funds were utilized during the year. The 
utilization ratio is particularly low in poorer states. If we look at the fund utilization ratio, 
defined as the fund allocation to actual utilization, it is again low in the poorer states of 
country (Figure 1). The trend line plotted through the scatter shows a positive slope, implying 
the states with higher per capita income could manage to spend better. The structure of   14
NREGA funding is also given in Table 6. In order to find out whether there is any relationship 
of fund allocation across states with the EG enrollment and the share of rural BPL 
households, we have plotted them in Figure 2. It is evident from the figure that there is no 
clear one-to-one relationship between share of BPL households and the fund release, rather it 
depends on the enrollment, which is quite likely as it is a demand-driven scheme. A quick 
regression of the functional form specified in Equation (1) reveals that the release of funds is 
positively related to wage rate and enrollment, not on the per capita income of the state and 
the share of BPL households. This, in other words, implies that the states that are making a 
better assessment of demand are obtaining more of the resources. This is potentially 
regressive, as the states at low levels of organizational capacity in terms of 
planning, management, and forecasting of labor demand of the schemes would receive less 
resources, even when the actual demand may be far higher than what is actually realized. 
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ϕ φ δ χ β α + + + + + = Wage enrol Bpl Lpci Lfund       
Where  
rate wgae of Wage
enrolment of Enrol
households BPL of share the of bpl













































S.E. of regression  0.66 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.573   16

































           Source (basic data): http://nrega.nic.in/ 
 
 
B.  Budgetary Incidence 
In order to understand whether NREGA implementation is a huge fiscal strain, we examined 
budgetary incidence of other employment programs (self and wage employment) prior to 
NREGA and compared them with NREGA-based allocation. As can be seen from Table 7, 
though the central government mobilizes around 10 percent of GDP as revenue and size of the 
government measured as a percentage of GDP is around 15 percent, the direct expenditure on 
rural employment constituted 0.2 percent of GDP in 1996–97, which declined to 0.13 percent 











General Category States 
Bihar  62.15 4.02  32.79  1.03 
Uttar Pradesh  68.10 3.66  26.11  2.13 
Orissa  53.63 9.07  36.56  0.73 
Jharkhand  62.56 7.65  28.78  1.02 
Madhya Pradesh  63.71 5.52  30.34  0.43 
Chhattisgarh  67.65 2.33  29.76  0.26 
Rajasthan  80.85 2.97  15.48  0.70 
West Bengal  82.00 2.69  13.11  2.19 
Andhra Pradesh  80.64 0.20  0.61  18.54 
Karnataka  60.45 2.90  33.84  2.80 
Tamil Nadu  54.67 0.00  0.67  44.67 
Gujarat  62.90 1.02  9.71  26.38 
Kerala  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Punjab  58.60 0.00  39.17  2.22 
Haryana  70.40 0.75  15.19  13.66 
Maharashtra  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Special Category States 
Assam  58.45 1.13  38.10  2.31 
Manipur  58.60 4.19  37.20  0.00 
Jammu & Kashmir 63.96 21.11  14.07  0.86 
Uttaranchal  53.46 4.53  41.29  0.72 
Meghalaya  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Arunachal Pradesh  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Tripura  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Sikkim  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Nagaland  60.00 0.00  40.00  0.00 
Mizoram  77.76 0.00  0.00  22.24 
Himachal Pradesh  60.30 4.85  33.95  0.90 
All States  67.29  4.38  25.62  2.71   17
of GDP in 2001, particularly at a time when human deprivation increased in rural India. 
Although there was an increase in the direct expenditure on rural employment to 0.40 percent 
of GDP, it tended to decline thereafter and reached to 0.33 percent of GDP in 2006–07, even 
with the introduction of a NREG program in that year.  
 
Table 7: Key Budgetary Indicators to GDP Ratio (in percent) 
 
  1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
Revenue  Receipts  9.27 8.83 8.59 9.37 9.22 8.87 9.41 9.56 9.80 9.87 10.32 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
11.67 11.90 12.49 12.86 13.30 13.28 13.79 13.12 12.31 12.47 12.49 
Expenditure: 
Ministry of Rural 
Development 
(MORD) 
0.58 0.56 0.55 0.48 0.43 0.59 0.74 0.70 0.58 0.78 0.81 
Rural  Employment  0.24 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.20 0.40 0.37 0.23 0.33 0.33 
Total  Expenditure  14.76 15.31 16.05 15.39 15.58 15.95 16.25 17.08 15.94 14.40 14.43 
Source: Union Budget Documents (various issues) 
 
  In terms of budgetary incidence of rural employment program (REP), it is evident 
from Figure 3 that expenditure on REP as a percentage of revenues and expenditure of the 
government declined sharply in the first three years of the current decade, with a marginal 
increase in the years 2005–06, revised estimates (RE) and 2006–07, budget estimates (BE). 
Despite introduction of NREGA, no spurt in the budgetary incidence of this expenditure is 
worth exploring. As can be seen from Table 8, the allocation under Swaranjayanti Gram 
Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) declined sharply over the years, with a corresponding increase in 
the share of SGRY from 23.3 to 62.1 percent between 1999–00 and 2003–04. The share of 
SGRY allocation declined sharply thereafter, with a corresponding increase in the allocation 
for the National Food for Work Program (NFFWP). The NFFWP has been stopped with the 
introduction of NREGA in 2005–06. A sharp decline in SGRY is evident in 2006–07, with a 
corresponding increase in the share of allocation under NREGA. In absolute volume, the 
SGRY allocation declined from Rs. 9639.99 crores in 2003–04 to Rs. 2700 crores in 2006–07 
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Swaranjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana 
(SGSY) 
13.1  4.2 4.5 4.3 4.6 6.5 4.2 4.5 
Sampoorna  Gramin  Rozgar  Yojana  (SGRY) 23.3 15.1 32.2 56.9 62.1 33.1 35.8 11.2 
National Food for Work Programme  28.2  16.4  7.5  5.7  0.0  13.1  19.0  0.0 
National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.3 
Other  Expenditure  35.4 64.4 55.7 33.1 33.2 47.4 41.0 42.0 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Union Budget Documents (Various Issues) 
 
Figure 3: Budgetary Incidence of Rural Employment 




















































IV.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that the existing institutional arrangement is 
not sufficient enough in poorer states to implement NREGA in an effective manner. There is 
an urgent need for both vertical and horizontal coordination across levels of governments 
within the states. Some of the things that rural local bodies, especially the village Panchayats, 
can engage in for effective implementation of this act are: (i) demand based budgeting; (ii) 
advance planning to offer work on demand; and (iii) holistic and intersectoral planning of 
projects for work to avoid duplication. The “social audit” through Gram Sabha, as mentioned 
in the Act, can also help to revitalize the ineffective Gram Sabhas in many of these districts. 
The Gram Sabha can play an active role in planning, monitoring, and supervision of projects.   19
To institutionalize the implementation of the NREGA, there is an urgent need for defining the 
clear charter of roles and responsibilities through activity mapping, capacity building of all 
the agencies involved in the process of implementation, and imparting training for that 
purpose. By strengthening the institutional structure for community participation in decision 
making, a holistic approach would evolve towards convergence of asset creation and 
management. 
In many places, Panchayats do not have the necessary capacity to manage the schemes 
and capacity building ought to take place at Panchayat level. Devolution of responsibilities 
and strict accountability norms would accelerate capacity building at the levels of Panchayats 
and the scheme can effectively function as a demand-driven one. In assessing the demand for 
labor, Panchayat level preparation of labor budget, district wage list, and schedule of rates at 
the district Panchayat level would go a long way for effective implementation. Keeping the 
spatial dimension of the implementation in mind, the importance of the smooth flow of funds 
for implementation of projects in accordance with the demand, capacity building at village 
level, right to information to enable social audit effectively and accountability of 
functionaries, and an effective grievance redressal mechanism assumes critical importance.  
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